| Back |
|
|
An Unnecessary Crisis Setting the record straight
about Iran's nuclear program |
| In a region already suffering from upheaval and
uncertainty, a crisis is being manufactured in which there will be no
winners. Worse yet, the hysteria about the dangers of an alleged Iran
nuclear weapon program rest solely and intentionally on misperceptions and
outright lies. In the avalanche of anti-Iran media commentaries,
conspicuously absent is any reference to important facts, coupled with a
twisted representation of the developments over the past 25 years. Before
the international community is lead to another "crisis of
choice", it is imperative that the public knows all the facts and is
empowered to make an informed and sober decision about an impending
catastrophe. |
| 1- Systematic Pattern of Denial of Iran's Rights and Its
Impact on Transparency |
| Since early 1980s, Iran's peaceful nuclear program and its
inalienable right to nuclear technology have been the subject of the most
extensive and intensive campaign of denial, obstruction, intervention and
misinformation. |
- Valid and binding contracts to build nuclear power plants were
unilaterally abrogated;
- Nuclear material rightfully purchased and owned by Iran was
illegally withheld;
- Exercise of Iran's right as a shareholder in several national and
multinational nuclear power corporations was obstructed;
- Unjustified and coercive interventions were routinely made in order
to undermine, impede and delay the implementation of Iran's nuclear
agreements with third parties; and Unfounded accusations against
Iran's exclusively peaceful nuclear program were systematically
publicized.
|
| As a result, and merely in order to prevent further illegal
and illegitimate restrictions on its ability to procure its needed
materials and equipment, Iran had been left with no option but to be
discrete in its perfectly legal and exclusively peaceful activities. In
doing so, Iran broke no laws nor diverted its peaceful program to military
activities. It only refrained from disclosing the details of its programs.
In nearly all cases, it was not even obliged to disclose these programs
under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Therefore, while Iran's
rights under the NPT continued to be grossly and systematically violated,
and while major state parties to the Treaty persisted in their
non-compliance with many of their obligations under Articles I, IV and VI
of the Treaty in general, and under paragraph 2 of Article IV vis-à-vis
Iran in particular, Iran nevertheless continued to diligently comply with
all its obligations under the Treaty. |
| 2. Nuclear Technology OR Nuclear Weapons? |
| A vicious cycle of restrictions on Iran's nuclear program
and attempts by Iran to circumvent them through concealment and black
market acquisitions have fueled mutual suspicions. In this
self-perpetuating atmosphere, the conclusion is already drawn that Iran's
declared peaceful nuclear program is just a cover for developing atomic
weapons. But this conclusion is based on two erroneous assumptions, which
have been repeated often enough to become conventional wisdom. |
| 2.1- Iran Needs Nuclear Energy |
| 2.1.1. Nuclear Energy for an Oil-Rich Country |
| The first is that Iran has vast oil and gas resources and
therefore does not need nuclear energy. Although it is true that Iran is
rich in oil and gas, these resources are finite and, given the pace of
Iran's economic development, they will be depleted within two to five
decades. With a territory of 1,648,000 km2 and a population of about 70
million, projected to be more than 105 million in 2050, Iran has no choice
but to seek access to more diversified and secure sources of energy.
Availability of electricity to 46,000 villages now, compared to 4400
twenty five years ago, just as an example, demonstrates the fast growing
demand for more energy. And the youthfulness of the Iranian population,
with around 70% under 30, doesn't allow complacency when it comes to
energy policy. To satisfy such growing demands, Iran can't rely
exclusively on fossil energy. Since Iranian national economy is still
dependant on oil revenue, it can't allow the ever increasing domestic
demand affect the oil revenues from the oil export. |
| 2.1.2. US Support for Iranian Nuclear Program |
| Iran's quest for nuclear energy picked momentum following a
study in 1974 carried out by the prestigious US-based Stanford Research
Institute, which predicted Iran's need for nuclear energy and recommended
the building of nuclear plants capable of generating 20,000 megawatts of
electricity before 1994. Now, 30 years later, Iran aims at reaching that
level by 2020, which may save Iran 190 million barrels of crude oil or $10
billion per year in today's prices. |
| Therefore, Iran's nuclear program is neither ambitious nor
economically unjustifiable. Diversification - including the development of
nuclear energy - is the only sound and responsible energy strategy for
Iran. |
| Even the US State Department was convinced of this in 1978
when it stated in a memo that the U.S. was encouraged by Iran's efforts to
expand its non-oil energy base and was hopeful that the U.S.-Iran Nuclear
Energy Agreement would be concluded soon and that U.S. companies would be
able to play a role in Iran's nuclear energy projects. |
| 2.1.3. Nuclear Fuel Cycle |
| Producing fuel for its nuclear power plants is an integral
part of Iran's nuclear energy policy. While domestic production of fuel
for this number of nuclear power plants makes perfect economic sense,
Iran's decision should not be judged solely on economic grounds. Having
been a victim of a pattern of deprivation from peaceful nuclear material
and technology, Iran cannot solely rely on procurement of fuel from
outside sources. Such dependence would in effect hold Iran's multi-billion
dollar investment in power plants hostage to the political whims of
suppliers in a tightly controlled market. Furthermore, it is self evident
that the time-consuming efforts to gain the necessary technology and
develop the capability for fuel production must proceed simultaneously
with the acquisition and construction of nuclear power plants. Otherwise
constructed plans may become obsolete in case of denial of fuel without a
contingency capacity to produce it domestically. |
| 2.2. Iran Does Not Need Nuclear Weapons for Its Security |
| The second false assumption is that because Iran is
surrounded by nuclear weapons in all directions - the U.S., Russia,
Pakistan and Israel - any sound Iranian strategists must be seeking to
develop a nuclear deterrent capability for Iran as well. |
| It is true that Iran has neighbors with abundant nuclear
weapons, but this does not mean that Iran must follow suit. In fact, the
predominant view among Iranian decision-makers is that development,
acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons would only undermine Iranian
security. Viable security for Iran can be attained only through inclusion
and regional and global engagement. Iran's history is the perfect
illustration of its geo-strategic outlook. Over the past 250 years, Iran
has not waged a single war of aggression against its neighbors, nor has it
initiated any hostilities. |
| Iran today is the strongest country in its immediate
neighborhood. It does not need nuclear weapons to protect its regional
interests. In fact, to augment Iranian influence in the region, it has
been necessary for Iran to win the confidence of its neighbors, who have
historically been concerned with size and power disparities. |
| On the other hand, Iran, with its current state of
technological development and military capability, cannot reasonably rely
on nuclear deterrence against its adversaries in the international arena
or in the wider region of the Middle East. Moreover, such an unrealistic
option would be prohibitively expensive, draining the limited economic
resources of the country. In sum, a costly nuclear-weapon option would
reduce Iran's regional influence and increase its global vulnerabilities
without providing any credible deterrence. |
| There is also a fundamental ideological objection to
weapons of mass destruction, including a religious decree issued by the
leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran prohibiting the development,
stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons. |
| 3. Negotiations with UK, France and Germany (EU3) |
| 3.1. Iran's Transparency and Confidence-Building
Measures |
| In October 2003, Iran entered into an understanding with
France, Germany and the United Kingdom with the explicit expectation to
open a new chapter of full transparency, cooperation and access to nuclear
and other advanced technologies. Iran agreed to a number of important
transparency and voluntary confidence building measures and immediately
and fully implemented them. |
- It signed and immediately began full implementation of the
Additional Protocol;
- It opened its doors to one of the most expansive and intrusive IAEA
inspections;
- It provided a detailed account of its peaceful nuclear activities,
all of which had been carried out in full conformity with its rights
and obligations under the NPT; It began and has continuously
maintained for the past 2 years a voluntarily suspension of its
rightful enrichment of Uranium as a confidence building measure;
- It further expanded its voluntary suspension in February and
November 2004, following agreements with EU3 in Brussels and Paris
respectively, to incorporate activities which go well beyond the
original IAEA's definition of "enrichment" and even
"enrichment-related" activities.
|
| 3.1.1. Resolution of Outstanding Issues |
| Iran has worked closely with the IAEA, during the course of
the last two years, to deal with the issues and questions raised about its
peaceful nuclear program. All significant issues, particularly those
related to the sources of HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) have now been
resolved. Indeed, except for few mostly speculative questions, nothing
more remains to close this Chapter |
| 3.1.2. No Indication of Non-Peaceful Activity |
| The Agency's thorough inspections of Iran have repeatedly
confirmed Iran's assertion that no amount of inspection and scrutiny will
ever show the slightest diversion into military activity. The
Director-General confirmed in Paragraph 52 of his November 2003 report
that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared
nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a
nuclear weapons program." After one more year and over a thousand
person-days of the most rigorous inspections, the Director-General again
confirmed in Paragraph 112 of his November 2004 report that "all the
declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore
such material is not diverted to prohibited activities." This
conclusion has been repeatedly reaffirmed in every statement by
responsible authorities of the IAEA. |
| 3.2. Broken Promises and Expanded Demands by the EU3 |
| Regrettably, Iran received very little, if anything, in
return for its transparency, cooperation and voluntary suspension of the
exercise of its legitimate and inalienable right. The European negotiating
partners, pressured by the US, instead of carrying out their promises of
cooperation and open access, have repeatedly called for expansion of
Iran's voluntary confidence building measures only to be reciprocated by
more broken promises and expanded requests: |
- The October 2003 promises of the EU3 on nuclear cooperation and
regional security and non-proliferation was never even addressed.
- The February 2004 written and signed commitment by the EU3 to
"work actively to gain recognition at the June 2004 Board of the
efforts made by Iran, so that the Board works thereafter on the basis
of Director-General reporting if and when he deems it necessary, in
accordance with the normal practice pertaining to the implementation
of Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol" was
violated, even though Iran had in fact carried out its part of the
deal by expanding its suspension to include assembly and component
manufacturing. Instead, the EU3 proposed a harsh resolution with
further unjustifiable demands in June 2004;
- The EU3 never honored its recognition, in the Paris Agreement of
November 2004, of "Iran's rights under the NPT exercised in
conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without
discrimination." In spite of its repeated and publicized claims,
the EU3 never offered, throughout the negotiations process, any
meaningful incentives to Iran, other than empty and demeaning
"promises" of "consideration" of "possible
future cooperation".
|
| 4. The Paris Agreement |
| In November 2004, following extensive negotiations, Iran
and EU3 agreed on a package that has become known as the Paris Agreement.
The objective of the Paris Agreement was to "to move forward" in
"negotiations, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable
agreement on long term arrangements. The agreement will provide objective
guarantees that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful
purposes. It will equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear,
technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security
issues." |
| The Paris Agreement envisaged that "while negotiations
proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term
arrangements," and "to build further confidence, Iran has
decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to
include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities." At the
same time, the EU3 recognized "that this suspension is a voluntary
confidence building measure and not a legal obligation" as well as
"Iran's rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with its
obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination." |
| The Paris Agreement rested on the premise that the purpose
of the Agreement was reaching mutually acceptable long term arrangements
and that suspension was a temporary measure for as long as negotiations
were making progress. The Agreement further envisaged specific mechanisms
to monitor and assess progress. |
| 4.1. March Report: Lack of Progress |
| In March 2005, in accordance with the Paris Agreement,
senior officials from Iran and the three European countries were mandated
to make an assessment of the progress that had been achieved. The reports
of over three months of negotiations by the working groups, created by the
Paris Agreement, made it evident that while there was every prospect for
reaching a negotiated solution based on the Paris Agreement, and while
Iran had made many significant and far-reaching proposals benefiting both
sides, the EU3, faced with extraneous pressure, were simply trying to
prolong fruitless negotiations. This policy, in addition to its
devastating impact on mutual trust, was detrimental to Iran's interests
and rights as it attempted to superficially prolong Iran's voluntary
suspension by dragging the negotiations. |
| It also became evident that despite repeated requests by
Iran from EU3 representatives to present their proposals and ideas on the
implementation of various provisions of the Paris Agreement to the working
groups, the European three did not have the intention or the ability to
present its proposals on "objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear
program is exclusively for peaceful purposes [and] equally … firm
guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm
commitments on security issues" as called for in that Agreement. |
| In short, it became evident that after massive pressure
from the United States in the winter of 2005, the EU3 had conceded to
unilaterally altering the Paris Agreement into solely an instrument of
de-facto cessation of Iranian peaceful enrichment program, in violation of
the letter and spirit of that Agreement. |
| 4.2. Iran's Proposals |
| In February 2005, Iran suggested to the EU3 to ask the IAEA
to develop technical, legal and monitoring modalities for Iran's
enrichment program as objective guarantees to ensure that Iran's nuclear
program would remain exclusively for peaceful purposes. While one member
of EU3 accepted the suggestion, unfortunately the lack of consensus among
the EU3 prevented resort to the IAEA as an authoritative and impartial
framework for solving the impasse. |
| On March 23, 2005, in a clearly stated desire to salvage
the Paris Agreement, Iran offered a collection of solutions for objective
guarantees suggested by various independent scientist and observers from
the United States and Europe. The package included: |
- Strong and mutually beneficial relations between Iran and the EU/EU3,
which would provide the best guarantee for respect for the concerns of
each side;
- Confinement of Iran's enrichment program, in order to preclude
through objective technical guarantees any proliferation concern:
|
- Open fuel cycle, to remove any concern about reprocessing and
production of plutonium;
- Ceiling of enrichment at LEU level;
- Limitation of the extent of the enrichment program to solely meet
the contingency fuel requirements of Iran's power reactors;
- Immediate conversion of all enriched Uranium to fuel rods to
preclude even the technical possibility of further enrichment;
Incremental and phased approach to implementation in order to begin
with the least sensitive aspects of the enrichment program and to
gradually move to enrichment as confidence in the program would be
enhanced;
|
- Legislative and regulatory measures
|
- Additional Protocol;
- Permanent ban on the development, stockpiling and use of nuclear
weapons through binding national legislation;
- Enhancement of Iran's export control regulations;
|
- Enhanced monitoring
|
- Continued implementation of the Additional Protocol; and
- Continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the conversion
and enrichment facilities to provide unprecedented added guarantees.
|
| 4.2.1. EU3 Inability to React |
| Extraneous pressure had resulted in the absence of any
desire or ability by EU3 to even consider any "objective
guarantee" as called for in the Paris Agreement and instead to
maneuver to achieve a de-facto cessation of Iran's lawful activities. This
extraneous political element precluded even a serious review by EU3 of
these independently worked out proposals, which continue to have the most
credible potential of providing a basis for allaying all reasonable
concerns. |
| Even Iran's further good-faith effort on April 29, 2005 to
salvage the process by suggesting the negotiated resumption of the work of
the UCF- which had never had any past alleged failures, and is virtually
proliferation free - at low capacity and with additional confidence
building and surveillance and monitoring measures was rejected outright by
EU3 officials without even consideration at political level. |
| 4.2.2. Prelude to Breakdown in Nuclear Talks |
| Iran replied to such intransigence with self-restraint to
ensure that no opportunity was spared for an agreed settlement. In a
ministerial meeting in Geneva in May 2005, Iran agreed to extend the
period of full suspension for another two months, in response to a
commitment made by the EU3 ministers to finally present their
comprehensive package for the implementation of the Paris Agreement by the
end of July or early August 2005, that is nearly nine months after the
Agreement. |
| Iran made it clear in Geneva that any proposal by the EU3
must incorporate EU3's perception of objective guarantees for the gradual
resumption of the Iranian enrichment program, and that any attempt to turn
objective guarantees into cessation or long-term suspension were
incompatible with the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement and
therefore unacceptable to Iran. |
| 4.2.3. A Further Compromise Suggested by Iran |
| Eager to salvage the negotiations, in a further message to
the Ministers, Iran offered the most flexible solution to the EU3 as they
were finalizing their package: |
| Commencement of the work of Esfahan plant (UCF) |
- At low capacity,
- Under full scope monitoring,
- Agreed arrangements for import of the feed material and export of
the product;
- Initial limited operation at Natanz following
- Further negotiations on a mutually acceptable arrangement, or
- Allowing the IAEA to develop an optimized arrangement on numbers,
monitoring mechanism and other specifics;
|
| Full scale operation of Natanz: |
- Based on a negotiated agreement;
- Synchronized with the fuel requirements of future light water
reactors.
|
| 4.3. EU's Package: Too Many Demands, No Incentives |
| Against all its sincere efforts and maximum flexibility, on
5 August 2005 Iran received a disappointing proposal. It not only failed
to address Iran's rights for peaceful development of nuclear technology,
but did not offer anything to Iran in return. It even fell far short of
correcting the illegal and unjustified restrictions placed on Iran's
economic and technological development, let alone providing firm
guarantees for economic, technological and nuclear cooperation and firm
commitments on security issues. While Iran had made it crystal clear that
no incentive would be sufficient to compromise Iran's inalienable right to
all aspects of peaceful nuclear technology, the offers of incentives
incorporated in the proposal were in and of themselves demeaning and
totally incommensurate with Iran and its vast capabilities, potentials and
requirements. |
| 4.3.1. Extra-Legal Demands of Binding Commitments from
Iran |
| The proposal self-righteously assumed rights and licenses
for the EU3 which clearly went beyond or even contravened international
law and assumed obligations for Iran which have no place in law or
practice. It incorporated a series of one-sided and self serving
extra-legal demands from Iran, ranging from accepting infringements on its
sovereignty to relinquishing its inalienable rights. |
| It sought to intimidate Iran to accept intrusive and
illegal inspections well beyond the Safeguards Agreement or the Additional
Protocol. It asked Iran to abandon most of its peaceful nuclear program.
It further sought to establish a subjective, discriminatory and arbitrary
set of criteria for the Iranian nuclear program, which would have
effectively dismantled most of Iran's peaceful nuclear infrastructure,
criteria that if applied globally would only monopolize the nuclear
industry for the Nuclear-Weapon States. |
| 4.3.2. Vague, Conditional and Demeaning Offers to Iran |
| The proposal had absolutely no firm guarantees or
commitments and did not even incorporate meaningful or serious offers of
cooperation to Iran. It amounted to an elongated but substantively
shortened and self-servingly revised version of an offer that had been
proposed by EU3 and rejected by Iran in October 2004 even prior to the
Paris Agreement. This indicated that there was no attempt on the part of
EU3 to even take into consideration the letter and spirit of the Paris
Agreement in their proposal. This point is further illustrated by the fact
that the proposal never even mentioned the terms "objective
guarantees", "firm guarantees" or "firm
commitments", which were the foundations of the Paris Agreement.
Instead it tried to replace "objective guarantees" with
termination of Iran's hard gained peaceful nuclear program, and replace
"firm guarantees and firm commitments" with vague, conditional
and partial restatements of existing obligations. |
| In the area of security, the proposal did not go beyond
repeating UN Charter principles or previously-made general commitments.
Worse yet, the proposal even attempted to make EU3's commitment to these
general principles of international law optional, partial, and conditional
by prefacing the segment with the following statement: "The EU3
propose that, within the context of an overall agreement, this section
could include, inter alia, the following mutual commitments in conformity
with the Charter of the United Nations." |
| Another example is the negative security assurances
provided in the proposal by the nuclear-weapons states of the EU3. The
proposal offered the mere repetition - only by UK and France -- of a
universal commitment already made by all nuclear weapon states in 1995 to
all NPT members. It even made the application of that commitment to Iran
contingent on an overall agreement by stating "Within the context of
an overall agreement and Iran's fulfillment of its obligations under the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United
Kingdom and France would be prepared to reaffirm to Iran the unilateral
security assurances given on 6 April 1995, and referred to in United
Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995)." |
| In the area of technology cooperation, it failed to include
even an indication - let alone guarantees -- of the EU3 readiness to
abandon or ease its violations of international law and the NPT with
regard to Iran's access to technology. For instance, while under the NPT,
the EU3 is obliged to facilitate Iran's access to nuclear technology, the
proposal makes a conditional and ambiguous offer "not to impede
participation in open competitive tendering." And far from the
generally advertised offer of EU cooperation with Iran in construction of
new nuclear power plants, the proposal generously offered to "fully
support long-term co-operation in the civil nuclear field between Iran and
Russia." |
| In the area of economic cooperation, the proposal only
included a conditional recital of already existing commitments and
arrangements. While most of the document amounted to general promises of
future considerations, even specific offers went no further than
conditional expressions of "readiness to discuss." Two examples
may be sufficient in this regard: "The EU3 would continue to promote
the sale of aircraft parts to Iran and be willing to enter into discussion
about open procurement of the sale of civil passenger aircraft to
Iran." Or, "the EU3 and Iran, as well as the Commission, would
discuss possible future oil and gas pipeline projects." |
| This proposal made it self-evident that negotiations were
not "proceeding" as called for in the Paris Agreement, due to
EU3 policy of disregarding the requirements of that Agreement, reverting
to their pre-Agreement positions, and prolonging a semblance of
negotiations without the slightest attempt to move forward in fulfilling
their commitments under the Tehran or Paris Agreements. This protracted
continuation was solely designed to keep the suspension in place for as
long as it takes to make "cessation" a fait accompli. This was
contrary to the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement and was not in
line with principles of good faith negotiations. |
| In short, the proposal, read objectively in the context of
the negotiating history of the Paris Agreement as well as its letter and
spirit, clearly illustrates the total abandonment of that Agreement by the
EU3, who have conveniently accused Iran of the same. |
| 4.3.3. Minimal Reaction from Iran |
| After such a long period of negotiations and all that Iran
had done and continues to do in order to restore confidence as well as the
flexibility that Iran has shown, there was no pretext for any further
delay in the implementation of the first phase of Iran's proposal, by
limited resumption of UCF at Isfahan, which has been free from any past
alleged failures, and is virtually proliferation free. In this context,
Iran informed the Agency of its decision to resume the uranium conversion
activities at the UCF in Isfahan and asked the Agency to be prepared for
the implementation of the Safeguards related activities in a timely manner
prior to the resumption of the UCF activities. |
| 4.4. Who Violated the Paris Agreement? |
| According to the Paris Agreement, "the suspension will
be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement
on long-term arrangements." It also envisaged a mechanism for
assessment of progress within three months. In the meeting of 23 March
2005, it was clear that there had been no progress over the preceding
three months. As a clearly-stated attempt to salvage the agreement, Iran
made its March 23rd proposal in terms of a package of objective
guarantees. |
| The refusal of the EU3 to even consider that package
coupled with their behavior in the course of the negotiations, their
August 2005 proposal and their repeated statements during the time of the
presentation of that proposal and since then made in abundantly clear that
under pressure from the US following the Paris Agreement, the EU3 had
decided to unilaterally change the nature of the Paris Agreement. This
amounted to a breach of the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement as
well as the principle of good-faith negotiations. |
| The EU3 negotiating posture and the empirical evidence of
lack of progress had in fact removed any onus from Iran to continue the
suspension. However, Iran decided to maintain the suspension of all
enrichment related activities and resume only the UCF process, which is by
definition a pre-enrichment process. Therefore, the assertion that Iran
broke the Paris Agreement is a self-serving and factually false
proposition. In fact, the reverse is the case. |
| 5. Iran Goes the Extra Mile for a Negotiated Solution |
| The Islamic Republic of Iran has always wanted to ensure
that no effort is spared in order to reach a negotiated resumption of its
enrichment activities. It, therefore, engaged in good faith and intensive
negotiations with the EU3 and other interested delegations during the
Summit of the United Nations in September 2005 in order to remove
obstacles to the resumption of good-faith and result-oriented negotiations
in accordance with established rights and obligations under the NPT. In
this context, Iran responded positively to a proposal which would have
removed any concern about the continued operation of the UCF in Isfahan at
lower capacity for a specific period to allow negotiations to reach
results. Iran also agreed to resume negotiations with the EU3 and to
consider all proposals that had been presented. |
| Furthermore, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
in his address to the General Assembly on September 17, 2005, made yet
another far reaching offer of added guarantee by inviting international
partnership in Iran's enrichment activities. |
| While the President reiterated that Iran's right to have
fuel cycle technology was not negotiable, he presented the following
confidence-building positions and proposals in his statement: |
- Readiness for constructive interaction and a just dialogue in good
faith;
- Prohibition of pursuit of nuclear weapons in accordance with
religious principles;
- Necessity to revitalize the NPT;
- Cooperation with the IAEA as the centerpiece of Iran's nuclear
policy;
- Readiness to continue negotiations with the EU3;
- Readiness to consider various proposals that have been presented;
- Welcome the proposal of South Africa to move the process forward;
- Acceptance of partnership with private and public sectors of other
countries in the implementation of uranium enrichment program in Iran
which engages other countries directly and removes any concerns.
|
| 6. Abuse of IAEA Machinery |
| Regrettably, the EU3, pressed by the United States, adopted
a path of confrontation in the September 2005 IAEA Board of Governors
meeting. In clear violation of their October 2003 and November 2004
commitments, the EU3moved a politically motivated and factually and
legally flawed resolution in the IAEA Board of Governors, and together
with the United States and using all their combined diplomatic and
economic leverages imposed it on the Board through an unprecedented resort
to voting rather than the previously unbroken practice of consensus. |
| 6.1. No Legal or Factual Grounds for IAEA
"Findings" |
| The imposed resolution makes a mockery of the proceedings
of the Board of Governors by rehashing alleged failures that had already
been dealt with in the November 2003 Board. At that time, despite the
existence of ambiguities and serious questions on important issues such as
the source of HEU contamination, "findings" of
"non-compliance" or "absence of confidence" in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's program were impossible. |
| The Board refrained from making such findings in 2003 not
because of a now-claimed "voluntary restraint" by EU3, but
because such were factually and legally impossible due to the nature of
failures - which were solely of technical reporting character -- and also
because of the fact that the Director-General had specifically stated in
his November 2003 report that "to date, there is no evidence that the
previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above
were related to a nuclear weapons program." It is ironic that after
two years of cooperation, over 1200 person/days of intrusive inspections,
resolution of nearly all outstanding issues particularly the foreign
source of contamination, and after repeated reiteration of the finding of
non-diversion including the conclusion in the IAEA November 2004 report
that "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted
for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited
activities," the imposed resolution discovered ex post facto that the
failures "detailed in Gov/2003/75 [the aforementioned report of
November 2003] constitutes non-compliance." |
| 6.2. The Real Story: Pressure to Deny Iran's Inalienable
Rights |
| While the resolution attempted to create a convenient -
albeit false - pretext of these alleged and old reporting failures for its
so-called "findings", it is abundantly clear that the reason for
production of this resolution was by no means those alleged failures, but
instead the resumption of Iran's perfectly legal and safeguarded
activities in Isfahan. |
| In this context, it must be underlined that all States
party to the NPT, without discrimination, have an inalienable right to
produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As this right is
"inalienable", it cannot be undermined or curtailed under any
pretext. Any attempt to do so, would be an attempt to undermine a pillar
of the Treaty and indeed the Treaty itself. |
| Iran, like any other Non-Nuclear-Weapon State, had no
obligation to negotiate and seek agreement for the exercise of its
"inalienable" right, nor could it be obligated to suspend it.
Suspension of Uranium enrichment, or any derivative of such suspension, is
a voluntary and temporary confidence-building measure, effectuated by Iran
in order to enhance cooperation and close the chapter of denials of access
to technology imposed by the west on Iran. It is not an end in itself, nor
can it be construed or turned into a permanent abandonment of a perfectly
lawful activity, thereby perpetuating, rather than easing, the pattern of
denial of access to technology. |
| The suspension of Uranium enrichment has been in place for
nearly two years, with all its economic and social ramifications affecting
thousands of families. The EU3 failed to remove any of the multifaceted
restrictions on Iran's access to advanced and nuclear technology. In a
twist of logic, it even attempted to prolong the suspension, thereby
trying to effectively widen its restrictions instead of fulfilling its
commitments of October 2003 and November 2004 to remove them. |
| As the IAEA Board of Governors had underlined in its past
and current resolution, suspension "is a voluntary, non-legal binding
confidence building measure". When the Board itself explicitly
recognizes that suspension is "not a legally-binding
obligation", no wording by the Board can turn this voluntary measure
into an essential element for anything. In fact the Board of Governors has
no factual or legal ground, nor any statutory power, to make or enforce
such a demand, or impose ramifications as a consequence of it. |
| 7. The Way Forward: No Coercion, Good-Faith Negotiations |
| The recently imposed resolution on the IAEA Board of
Governors is devoid of any legal authority, and any attempt to implement
it will be counter-productive and will leave Iran with no option but to
suspend its voluntary confidence building measures. The threat of referral
to the Security Council will only further complicate the issue and will
not alter Iran's resolve to exercise its legitimate and inalienable rights
under the NPT. At the same time, Iran is determined to pursue good-faith
interaction and negotiations, based on equal footing, as the centerpiece
of its approach to the nuclear issue. A diplomatic and negotiated
framework is the desired approach for a successful outcome and Iran is
ready to consider all constructive and effective proposals. Iran welcomes
consultations and negotiations with other countries in order to facilitate
the work of the Agency and calls on the EU3 to replace the course of
confrontation with interaction and negotiation to reach understanding and
agreement. |
- The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to non-proliferation and
the elimination of nuclear weapons, and considers nuclear weapons and
capability to produce or acquire them as detrimental to its security.
Iran will continue to abide by its obligations under the NPT and will
continue to work actively for the establishment of a zone free from
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
- An Unnecessary Crisis - Setting the Record Straight about Iran's
Nuclear Program
|
|
| Back |
